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20 JUN 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Inspector General's Survey of the Soviet Republics
Division, Deputy Director for Plans

1. The attached report summarizes the results of the Inspector General's survey of the Soviet Republics Division, DD/P, and is submitted for your consideration.
2. In general, this inspection concludes that to attack in every way possible the Agency's most important intelligence target--the Soviet Union--there must be in the Clandestine Services a single component dedicated to this task. The Soviet Republics Division (SR), in the main, is pursuing its operational objectives aggressively, but at times not too effectively, largely because of the numerous encumbrances and limitations imposed on the Division. This survey has noted the major problems believed to be serious impediments to the conduct of operations against the USSR. Corrective action is proposed in this report in the form of specific recommendations for your approval.
3. Also attached is a memorandum of transmittal to the DD/P for your signature requesting that he provide you with his comments on the survey no later than 1 **Sept** 1956.


Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

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Attachment
Subject Survey - TS-158440

Distribution:

- Cy. 1 w/atchmt - Addressee
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- Cy. 3 w/atchmt - DD/P
- Cy. 4 w/atchmt - SR Division via DD/P

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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
SOVIET RUSSIA DIVISION

JUNE 1956

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SR DIVISION SURVEY

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
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I. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND SUMMARY

A. This report is based on a comprehensive inspection of the Soviet Republics Division (SR) at Headquarters and a selective inspection of SR activities overseas at the [redacted] and the

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[redacted] This inspection also included discussions with personnel in the area divisions and senior staffs on matters related to SR Division's operations and inter-relations with all components in the Clandestine Services.

B. Within the limits set forth above, the purposes of this survey have been: (1) to appraise the adequacy of national policy directives with respect to the conduct of clandestine operations against the USSR; (2) to examine what impediments to SR operations have resulted from the continued inability of the Clandestine Services to produce a statement of the mission and functions for SR Division or to issue specific regulations detailing SR operational responsibilities and procedures; (3) to evaluate the Division's intelligence product and the effectiveness of its intelligence support activities; (4) to assess SR's operational endeavors in the fields of foreign intelligence (FI), counterespionage (CE), political [redacted], paramilitary (PM), [redacted] (5) to determine the effectiveness of SR's organization, management, and administration.

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C. The historical development of SR Division since 1947 leads to the firm conviction that the Clandestine Services must have a single unit for Russian operations if this Agency is to attack aggressively its most important target. SR Division should be dedicated to the

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immediate aim of developing a group of experienced officers capable of planning and directing all types of operations against the USSR and its external installations.

D. Despite the admitted importance of its target, SR Division has not been provided, as of the date of this survey, an authoritative statement of its mission and functions. The inability of the Clandestine Services to agree on an "SR charter" in more than a year devoted to the task is one of the major deficiencies noted during this inspection and has proved to be the single most illuminating aspect of this report in terms of identifying SR's most pressing organizational and functional problems.

E. The Division's failure to revise quickly and adequately its basic operational objectives is also serious. Over the past five years SR's published operational programs have changed little in substance or even in phrasing. The latest version ("Operational Program revised for FY 1957--initial FY 1958") lacks imaginative thinking in its preparation and does not reflect the changes which have been taking place in Soviet internal and foreign policies and which are largely responsible for provoking neutralist developments among the free world nations. The Chief of the SR Division has been aware of this and has required that his staff begin a review and make specific recommendations on the basic principles and plans for attacking the Soviet target. This effort was begun in September 1955 and is still unfinished. The importance of the task should require that this project be given a high priority.

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
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REDSKYN TRIPS INTO THE USSR MAY 1955 - MAY 1956


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— Routes taken by routine REDSKYN travelers.
- - - Routes of ships in joint shipping projects.

Total number of routine REDSKYN travellers.	60
Total number of resident agents (comes out once a year).	1
Total number of trained REDSKYN agents in joint projects with indigenous friendly intelligence services.	12
Total number of informants in joint projects with indigenous friendly intelligence services. (200 with one service alone)	Unknown
Total number of joint shipping projects shared with these services.	6

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